This paper discusses the re-emergence of biofuel innovation systems in the USA and Brazil. We develop a view of eco-innovation systems as emerging and evolving to solve ecological problems. We then consider the role of the State as a core actor in the mobilization of innovation systems and discuss how specific institutional arrangements, political contexts and technological competencies influence how problems are framed. We argue that the way ecological problems are framed and articulated has a significant impact on the direction and momentum of system evolution. Finally, we draw attention to the dynamic and evolving characteristics of eco-innovation systems that result from recurrent re-specifications of the problem in focus, as partial solutions emerge and as the political and economic dimensions are reframed.
Introduction
In 2004, the USA and Brazil produced almost exactly the same volume of bioethanol for use as a transport fuel. The oil shocks of the early 1970s provided the impetus for both countries to embark on developing these new productive capabilities, but the paths that have been followed since the 1970s to achieve this historical moment of convergence could hardly have differed more.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the contrasting biofuel innovation trajectories of the USA and Brazil. We discuss the emergence and evolution of innovation sequences in each country to explain differences in terms of the rate and direction of biofuel production capacity. That Brazil would choose sugar cane as its principal source of biomass, while the USA has chosen corn, is perhaps obvious. That the bioethanol sectors of both countries originated at roughly the same time, just after the oil shock of 1973, also appears straightforward. But, why did the USA fall behind, while the Brazilian biofuel sector grew? Why, subsequently, did the USA embark on a rapid expansion initiative in the early 2000s? What were the respective roles of governments in each case? We answer these questions by suggesting that the innovation sequences in each country were oriented towards solving different types of problem. The relative political importance of energy security, economic growth opportunities and combating climate change as drivers of innovation has played a significant role in producing the observed variation. As such, a key concern in our analysis is to develop a stronger understanding of how political responses to different types of problem have been translated into specific policy instruments to stimulate the rate and direction of biofuel innovation. We also seek explanations for how the new biofuel industrial regimes in each country differ in terms of long-standing institutional differences, perhaps most clearly in evidence when comparing the role of the State-owned oil company, Petrobras of Brazil, with its North American counterparts, as agents of innovation.
We present our analysis in the following way. In the next section, we introduce a framework for analysing the issues raised above, drawing on the concepts of innovation sequences and systems. We then outline our methodology. The following two sections present our case studies of the US and Brazilian experiences with biofuels. The final section presents our analysis and discussion.
Sequences and Systems of Innovation
The concept of the innovation system is now widely used to explain interactions between technological change and economic development, especially amongst those with a preference for evolutionary explanations. In its recent incarnation, the approach was used to describe national specificities in institutional arrangements to explain variability in innovation performance across countries (e.g. Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Freeman, 1995) . 60,000 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 9 Year
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Licht., Renewable Fuels Association (RFA) and US Department of Agriculture (USDA).
Subsequent analysis has delineated the system by a particular technology (e.g. Carlsson, 1997; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004; Hekkert et al., 2007) or a sector (e.g. Malerba, 2002) . These alternative approaches differ according to whether national institutions, specific characteristics of technologies or economic specificities of particular sectors are considered the dominant logic underpinning the dynamics and evolution of the innovation system under investigation. Later work, especially Markard and Truffer (2008) , usefully combine the approaches to suggest ways in which innovation dynamics can draw influence from all three spheres. This later approach is consistent with other contributions that have explicitly argued against the imposition of a priori boundaries to the analysis of innovation systems, preferring to understand them as unfolding in scale and scope over time (Coombs et al., 2003) . In other words, their geographical reach, sectoral orientation and technological content evolve as part of the innovation process itself. Boundaries are a transient outcome of the process, always subject to potential revision. An approach that provides a useful development to the concept of innovation systems in this respect, is the idea that they are problem oriented (Metcalfe and Ramlogan, 2008) . Understanding innovation systems as problem oriented (i.e. that they are formed to solve problems), provides dynamism and direction to the system: resources and capabilities are mobilized and coordinated in order to find a solution to the problem. Furthermore, since the problem is itself a moving target, the system evolves in response. In particular, a solution for one problem almost inevitably produces a new or modified problem and a renewed search for solutions. Thus innovation sequences occur with a recurrent pattern of changing problems and innovative solutions.
In this description of how innovation systems emerge and evolve to solve a problem, surprisingly little has been said about how problems are themselves constructed. Typically, it is implied that the problem is a functional one, associated with a fairly well-described societal need. In the medical realm, for example, the problem sequences for cataracts (Metcalfe et al., 2005) , coronary artery disease (Mina et al., 2007) or for HIV (Merito and Bonaccorsi, 2007) take the disease itself, in terms of its physiological symptoms and causes, as the problem to be solved. The solutions that are observed as the problem sequence unfolds are concerned with the "physical technologies" of the respective therapies themselves and the "social technologies" that account for how the new treatment is provisioned in the context of clinical practice (Nelson, 2005) .
But the functional problems that innovation systems are mobilized to solve are interwoven with social, economic and political factors and these can play a significant role in how the innovation system is constructed. The history of the origins of electricity for widespread use, as recounted by Hughes (1983) , illustrates the "seamless web" of technical, economic and political factors that formed "reverse salients" in the otherwise growing system and their associated "critical problems" to be solved by engineers. A reverse salient is a term borrowed from the military, and refers to sections of the advancing front line which fall behind. Hughes chose this term, as opposed to bottleneck, to emphasize the complexity framing a problem where individuals, groups, material forces and historical influences all play idiosyncratic causal roles. In his framework, the articulation of a problem often defines its solution, reverse salients become defined as a series of critical problems, and innovative activity is directed towards solving these problems.
This elaboration of how to conceptualize the nature of problems that are to be solved is significant for the present analysis. As we shall see, the functional need that biofuels seek to attend to is concerned with the movement of people and goods, as an energy source for transportation. At this level, biofuels compete with other viable transportation technologies. But because the problem has been constructed in different ways in different places, we have identified significant variation in the constitution of the emergent innovation sequences. They all share the goal of seeking to provide an alternative to oil as a transport fuel, but differ in the interweaving of specific motivations and supplementary conditions for doing so.
The final strand of our analytical approach focuses on the respective roles of public and private actors in emergent innovation systems and on the market and non-market forms of coordination that account for how knowledge and resources are exchanged within the system. We are suggesting a form of analysis that goes beyond a focus on how government policy facilitates the functions of innovation systems (Hekkert et al., 2007) or influences the performance of private innovation actors by establishing the appropriate incentive structures. To do this, we adopt a view that innovation is a multimodal economic process, involving the coordinated action of public and private actors in market and non-market modes of interaction (Harvey et al., 2002; Harvey and McMeekin, 2007) . In this approach, the focus is on comparative and historical variation. The varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) , that are manifestly different in Brazil and the USA, play a key role in explaining the institutional and organizational arrangements constructing the problem and subsequently generating solutions.
In adopting this type of approach we will try to make sense of the contrasting institutional arrangements in Brazil and the USA for incentivizing, structuring and organizing innovation and the importance of path dependencies relating to pre-existing organizational capabilities. We hope that this approach will be particularly useful for explaining differences in how the roughly similar volumes of bioethanol in 2004 were produced in significantly different institutional and organizational terms and why this came about as a result of the respective innovation systems being oriented towards different problem specifications.
Methodology
The country-specific case studies reported in this paper are part of a broader project "The Transition to a Sustainable Bioeconomy: Innovation and Expectations" comparing emerging bioeconomies in Europe, the USA and Brazil. As part of an extensive primary research programme we conducted semi-structured interviews during 2008 and early 2009 with key industrial and academic players in the USA and Brazil. In Brazil (19 interviews), we conducted interviews in Rio de Janeiro (Petrobras, university, government officials), Campinas (sugar cane biotechnology companies, scientists) and Piracicaba (biorefinery, bioethanol companies, scientists). In North America (14 interviews), we conducted interviews in Ottawa (cellulosic ethanol producer), Chicago and the Midwest (bioethanol producers, major agricultural firms, scientists), and the East Coast (cellulosic ethanol producers). Prior, and parallel, to the interview stage, we undertook qualitative institutional analysis and extensive secondary data analysis drawing on multiple sources of information, ranging from academic literature and government and industry association reports, to annual reports, press releases and newspaper coverage. We have triangulated the empirical data and present it as chronological narratives of the emerging and developing biofuel innovation systems of the USA and Brazil, respectively.
The USA and Bioethanol
The early story of competition between biofuels and petrol in the USA from the early twentieth century has been well documented (e.g. Dimitri and Effland, 2007; Solomon et al., 2007; Keeney, 2009 ). Ford's quadricycle ran on pure ethanol and the Model T was a flexible fuel vehicle. Petrol became the dominant fuel in the 1920s because of the abundant supply and relatively low price of oil. Yet ethanol was used to supplement petrol supplies during the depression and both world wars.
The key point for our analysis is that technological capabilities for biofuel transportation have existed for some time, remaining dormant until the problem space altered in such a way as to make them attractive again. As such, we move to the late 1970s which marks the beginning of the modern ethanol industry and describe the development of the US biofuels sector in three phases. The first phase explores the emergence and steady expansion of the modern US bioethanol industry (1978 -2000) . The second phase discusses the factors instrumental in the rapid expansion of the industry (2000 -2005) . Finally, we discuss what new trends are emerging in the US biofuels industry (2005 onwards).
Emergence and Steady Expansion (1978-2000)
The re-emergence of the US ethanol industry in the late 1970s was stimulated by the changing international economic and political landscape. Historical interest in ethanol as a transportation fuel corresponds with periods of war and fluctuating supplies of oil (NSEA, 2009) . This relationship between domestic and energy security was emphasized by a number of high profile events in the 1970s; the first of which was the Arab Oil Embargo (1973) . The embargo lasted a year and quadrupled the price of oil, exposing the vulnerability of Western economies to interruptions of supply. Energy security became a political problem and the US government responded with a variety of initiatives intended to stimulate domestic energy production.
Levels of State intervention increased after the 1979 OPEC oil crisis, the Iranian hostage crisis and the US grain embargo of the Soviet Union (The Ethanol Fact Book, 2007) . The heightening of government response mirrored the levels of economic vulnerability perceived in the USA and interventions were designed to stimulate existing (albeit dormant) domestic capabilities in ethanol production. Legislative action (e.g. The Energy Security Act, 1980) was fundamental to the emergence of this new ethanol industry and interventions took a variety of forms ranging from excise tax credits for biofuel producers and blenders, research funds to stimulate the development of domestic capacity and barriers on imports. Ethanol friendly policies and bills during the 1970s and 1980s were strongly supported by the farm and corn lobbies. Subsidies for consumption in this first phase were minor and mainly provided by government procurement programmes.
The political articulation of the energy security solution was demonstrated when President Carter asked the CEO of ADM, a large agricultural processing firm, to convert a new alcoholic drink plant into a synfuel plant.
1 ADM went on to expand their construction of new 1 ADM was the main manufacturer of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) and ethanol is another product of the corn wet milling process. An aggressive lobbying effort was undertaken by ADM who were seeking additional markets for the products of their mills (Keeney, 2009 ). This activity preceded the intervention by President Carter.
ethanol plants and by the end of the 1980s ADM accounted for 80 per cent of total US ethanol production capacity (Financial Times, 2008) . The emerging institutional configurations were influenced by existing capabilities. The large agricultural processors were well positioned in terms of access to feedstock, distribution networks and capital equipment to respond to the energy problem articulated by the government. By 2000, ADM was still the largest US producer accounting for 40 per cent of total capacity. The other large producers at the time were Minnesota Corn Processors 7 per cent, Cargill 6 per cent and Williams Energy 5 per cent. Forty-two per cent of total US ethanol production capacity was highly fragmented amongst small companies with less than 100 mgy 2 capacity. 3 The prominence of small producers was facilitated by the relatively large scale of agricultural farms in the USA, the formation of farmer cooperatives, relatively cheap ethanol production techniques and federal incentives to support small producers.
Rapid Expansion (2000 -2005)
The rapid expansion of the US ethanol industry was triggered by the specification of a new ecological problem for the biofuel innovation system to solve. The 1999 decision in California to ban the fuel additive methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) addressed concerns about groundwater contamination (Solomon et al., 2007; DOE, 2009 These firms focused on producing "first generation" 4 bioethanol from corn and played a pivotal role in "scaling-up" the USA's bioethanol capacity. In addition to this discrete environmental issue, concerns about energy security continued to be an important driver of the US ethanol industry. (Biomass R&D, 2009 ) marked a change in government intervention, and signalled renewed support and investment in R&D activity. This Act instructed the DOE and the USDA to integrate their biomass R&D and initiated a programme to develop technologies and feedstocks for bio-based fuels.
Continued Expansion and the New Technological Frontier (2005 Onwards)
In 2005 the Energy Policy Act (EPA) was passed. This is the most significant legislation affecting the demand side and established the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) which eliminated the mandated use of oxygenates in reformulated gasoline and mandated annual use of 7.5 billion gallons per year of renewable fuels in the US fuel supply by the year 2012. The EPA was motivated by energy security concerns but shaped by competing concerns about environmental quality and economic growth. Proposals to allow oil and gas production in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) were blocked but so were proposals to restrict greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increase car fuel economy standards (Holt and Glover, 2006: 10) Although the primary political driver of the biofuels system in the USA has been energy security (see Sissine, 2007 , for further details of provisions not included in the EISA 2007), climate change and socio-economic concerns have continued to significantly shape policy (see CAST, 2006) . In 2008 corn price spikes and food vs. fuel concerns coincided with the Searchinger et al. (2008) article on indirect land use change (ILUC) which raised concerns about the environmental impact of biofuel production, particularly first generation corn-toethanol. The rapidly expanding biofuel system oriented around an energy security problem suddenly faced a new reverse salient of how it impacted on climate change and food shortages. Developing a way to use agricultural residues and other waste streams emerged as the critical problem to be solved, relieving pressures on further land use change and competition between fuel and food.
Cellulosic ethanol was identified as the most viable, and quick, solution to the energy security problem and R&D in this area has been strongly promoted by government policy (Herrera, 2006) . The Biomass R&D Initiative instituted in the 2000 Biomass R&D Act promotes the development of cellulosic ethanol capabilities and innovative activity and was initially directed towards two major reverse salients: (1) developing better feedstocks (by genetically altering seeds) and (2) more efficient conversion processes (using biotechnology to create enzymes able to break down lignin efficiently). The programme outlines a number of explicit strategies for achieving a commercially viable cellulosic ethanol industry, including promoting collaborative R&D in feedstock and conversion technologies, supporting publicprivate partnerships to demonstrate large-scale integrated biomass systems and supporting activities to accelerate commercialization. The reverse salients of climate change and food shortages provided additional momentum and direction to the system as social and environmental problems gained political attention. Government stimulus for innovative and commercial activity in cellulosic ethanol increased. Support for the supply side and mandating demand stimulated a period of rapid growth in the US ethanol industry.
Brazil and Bioethanol
The pre-1970s historical development of the Brazilian ethanol industry shares many similarities with the emergence of the US industry, although State interest in biofuels ebbed and flowed more visibly in this period in relation to oil price fluctuations (Nunberg, 1986) . But, as with the USA, there was minimal ethanol production post-Second World War and the 1970s marks the beginning of the modern Brazilian ethanol industry.
The empirical data is presented in three phases corresponding with the significant changes in production shown on Figure 1 . In contrast to the USA ethanol production increased rapidly during the first phase (1976 -85) . During the second phase (1985-97) we see a period of slow growth followed by a drop in production levels. The third phase (2003 þ) is one of continued rapid expansion. However, by 2004 Brazilian and US volumes of ethanol production converge before the USA overtakes.
Emergence and Rapid Expansion (1975 -85)
The re-emergence of the Brazilian ethanol industry in the 1970s was stimulated by the changing international economic and political landscape, and shaped by the existing domestic situation. In 1973, Brazil was importing four-fifths of its oil (Winfield, 2008) and the oil shocks discussed in the US case study had significant implications for Brazil too. In addition to general economic dependence on oil, the newly industrializing, militarily run, country had a growing car production industry (central to Brazil's economic growth) and increasing levels of car ownership. At the same time the Brazilian economy was experiencing a sugar export crisis. In the early 1970s the burgeoning domestic sugar production capacity, the weakness of the world sugar market, the accelerating economic crisis and the growing emphasis on alcohol as a petroleum substitute, were the main factors influencing the emergence of the Brazilian ethanol industry (Nunberg, 1986) . Domestic economic concerns, existing industrial capacity, new economic opportunities and a powerful sugar cane lobby (Nass et al., 2007) were significant factors influencing the political framing and articulation of industrial and energy problems. These issues converged into a "bioethanol produced from sugar cane" solution.
The articulation of this solution by the Brazilian government was embodied by the establishment of the Proalcool Program in 1975. This programme was designed to promote national growth, reduce regional disparities and address energy dependency issues by coordinating the domestic production and consumption of ethanol. The Proalcool Program can be split into two phases: Phase 1 (1975-79) and Phase 2 (1979 -85). In the first phase the programme concentrated on producing anhydrous alcohol for blending with petrol.
A 20 per cent ethanol:80 per cent petrol target ratio was set as this was possible with the existing stock of cars. Petrobras, the State-owned oil company, was mandated to purchase a guaranteed amount of ethanol from producers, then blend and distribute the petrol-ethanol mix. This level of intervention by the State was enabled by the pre-existing politico-economic structure, including State ownership of Petrobras, and the concentration and centralization of the sugar cane industry under the Instituto de Azucar e Alcool (IAA). Emphasis was placed on increasing agricultural production, and modernizing and constructing production plants. The government operated a credits scheme for distillery construction and by 1979 there were 104 ethanol distilleries in operation. The price received by ethanol producers was also set close to the average costs of production, thus insulating producers from market fluctuations. In addition, the IAA implemented a national agricultural research programme to promote the development of new sugar cane varieties. This research accelerated the improvement in sugar cane yields.
The second oil crisis in 1979 stimulated expansion of the Proalcool Program. The blending of anhydrous ethanol with petrol had been so successful that maximum capacity was restricted by engine design, sugar and ethanol supplies. Phase 2 of the programme coordinated the production of hydrous alcohol for use in engines designed to run on pure ethanol. Initial efforts to develop a dedicated engine capable of running on pure ethanol were State controlled and conducted at the Centro de Tecnologia Aeronautica (CTA) in San Paulo (Goldemberg, 2008) . The State persuaded multinational car producers located in Brazil to commercialize this technology and invest in developing their production capacity. The involvement of the car industry was essential for the continuation of the programme and the government signed contracts with Fiat, VW, Mercedes-Benz, GM and Toyota to produce 250,000 cars by 1980 and 350,000 by 1982 (Sandalow, 2006) . The State simultaneously stimulated consumption by providing tax incentives for the purchase of cars run on hydrous ethanol and mandating that all government vehicles were ethanol fuelled. Further incentives were created in the early 1980s when the Brazilian government capped the pump price of hydrous alcohol at 64.5 per cent of the petrol price. Consumers responded by purchasing large numbers of ethanol powered vehicles and in the mid-1980s pure ethanol vehicles accounted for 80 per cent of all new cars sold (Ueki, 2007) . At the point of purchase by the consumer, the relative price of bioethanol has remained below petrol throughout the period and for most of the 2000s (De Almeida et al., 2007) . (1985 -2002) This phase of rapid growth is followed by a phase of stability, or stagnation. In 1985-86 there was a sharp drop in the international price of oil which coincided with economic depression and the transition to a civilian government. Production subsidies for the ethanol sector were withdrawn from 1986 (Lehtonen, 2007) . Consumption subsidies were maintained in order to minimize the risk of defaults on existing public loans. Supplies of ethanol were interrupted in 1988 when an increase in the world sugar price motivated many sugar producers to divert their crops to the world market. This resulted in a domestic fuel crisis and the abandonment of pure ethanol engine vehicles by car producers and consumers. Ethanol producers responded to the economic depression, reduction in demand and fall in world oil prices by reducing R&D budgets. Figure 1 shows an initial drop in ethanol production followed by fluctuating levels between 1998 and 2002. Since the creation of the Proalcool Program, the prices of fuel, and the prices received by ethanol producers, have been set by the Brazilian government. Prior to 1985, the price was set to correspond with the cost of production. After 1985, this price was set below the average cost of production in an attempt by the federal government to control inflation (Goldemberg et al., 2004) . Consumption subsidies for the ethanol sector ended in 1997 as part of the liberalization programme. This had an immediate impact on production levels which generally dropped as subsidies were withdrawn, prices fluctuated and stocks of ethanol declined. Minimum blending policies and import tariffs were maintained ensuring that ethanol retained a market and the focus in the sector shifted to R&D.
Industry Stagnation

Rapid Re-expansion (2003 Onwards)
The relatively low, but stable, level of Brazilian ethanol production ensured by mandatory 20 per cent ethanol -petrol blending, maintained the ethanol industry through a period of reduced government support and adverse economic conditions. However, in 2003 domestic ethanol production began to rapidly increase. The renewed interest in ethanol as a transportation fuel was the result of a number of inter-related social, political and economic factors. The USA had begun investing heavily in ethanol production and global economic growth increased the demand for oil, pushing the world price of oil up to record levels, peaking at $147 per barrel. Growing global concerns to reduce GHG emissions and dependence on Middle East oil imports led many countries to explore biofuels as one technological solution. This created a potential export market for Brazilian ethanol. The Brazilian government framed the global climate change problem as an economic opportunity. In 2007 the government explicitly aspired to substitute 10 per cent of the global use of petrol with Brazilian ethanol exports within two decades (Lehtonen, 2007 ethanol programme in Brazil had replaced approximately 1.5 per cent of petrol consumed worldwide (Goldemberg, 2008) . The introduction of the flexible fuel vehicle (FFV) to Brazil was fundamental to the expansion of the ethanol industry. In 2001 the Brazilian government agreed to offer the preferential tax rate applied to pure ethanol cars to FFVs (Lehtonen, 2007) . Ford launched their prototype in 2002 and VW entered the market in 2003. Figure 2 shows how successful the penetration of the FFV is in Brazil. At the beginning of 2006 approximately 75 per cent of new cars manufactured in Brazil were FFVs (e.g. Marris, 2006; Moreira, 2006) .
The FFV is capable of running on pure petrol, pure ethanol or any blend between. This increased the substitutability between the fuels for consumers (Hira and de Oliveira, 2009 ) and the substitutability between sugar and ethanol markets for producers. The resultant increase in the domestic market for bioethanol enabled by the success of the FFV has resulted in conflicts between domestic and export use. The government recently enacted legislation lowering the required percentage of ethanol in petrol blends to ensure that both domestic demand and export opportunities can be met. This further demonstrates the relative importance attributed to economic development.
New reverse salients have emerged and been articulated as critical problems as the system has evolved. In addition to infrastructure constraints to international distribution (an issue addressed by the State and key firms such as Petrobras), the vision of Brazil as a major exporter demands a significant increase in the volume of bioethanol produced. This reverse salient has been articulated as a series of critical problems related to increasing sugar cane yields and improving processing capabilities. Research based on traditional methods has been complemented by biotechnology approaches. Quite speculative genomic science initiated in 2000 (Harvey and McMeekin, 2005) has created the possibility for new transgenic sugar cane varieties. This has seen the emergence of new domestic biotechnology firms spun-out of the government research programmes, for example, Allelyx in plant genomics and Canavialis in sugar cane breeding. Sugar cane refining productivity has increased dramatically over the past decades and Dedini, the dominant equipment provider in this sector, has occupied a central position in the sugar refining innovation trajectory. During the 30-year period since ProAlcool ethanol production has multiplied by a factor of 30, yield per hectare has increased by 60 per cent and production costs have declined by 75 per cent (Nass et al., 2007) . As in the US case we see how the innovation system involves the coordinated action of public and private actors in market and non-market modes of interaction, but of course in markedly different ways.
Discussion and Conclusions
A central issue addressed in this paper is the framing and articulation of "problems" by the State, and the subsequent mechanisms employed to incentivize system emergence to address these problems. Understanding innovation systems as problem oriented provides dynamism and direction to the system, but requires a thorough analysis of how such problems are formulated and how they change over time. The biofuel industries of the USA and Brazil re-emerged during the 1970s in response to strategic interventions by their national governments intended to mobilize innovation systems around a set of specific problems. The case studies clearly demonstrate how global events, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s, can be framed in different ways, and that this framing is dependent on multiple technical, economic and political factors.
In order to develop our understanding of how innovation systems emerge and evolve, we drew on Hughes' concept of the reverse salient (1983) . This refers to the complex of economic, social, political and technological factors, which at a given point in time inhibit further growth of the system. The reverse salient is resolved into a technical problem that can be addressed by the innovation system. When there is a failure to solve a major problem in the old system, a new system or new subsystem emerges. In the USA, reliance on Middle Eastern oil was perceived as a major problem and this stimulated the emergence of a new domestic liquid fuel system. As oil prices reduced and supplies stabilized, political interest declined, and ethanol production capacity experienced marginal growth. In comparison, the international oil price shocks threatened economic growth and political stability in Brazil. The military-run, newly industrializing country had a growing car manufacturing industry and increasing levels of car ownership. Simultaneously, Brazil's sugar industry was experiencing an export crisis. The sugar and car industries were of strategic importance to the wider Brazilian economy, complete with powerful lobbies. Economic stability was critical to maintaining the political regime. Developing cane-to-ethanol capacity provided another market for the powerful sugar industry, fuel for increased domestic car ownership, which in turn facilitated growth of the domestic car manufacturing industry and reduced dependence on imported oil.
In both cases the evolution of problems, or problem sequences, provided direction and momentum to the emerging innovation system. Innovative activity was concentrated around emergent reverse salients which became defined as a series of critical problems. Once initial critical problems were solved, the system boundaries evolved and advanced, until new reverse salients emerged. For example, the successful scaling-up of biofuels production capacity in the USA altered the problem space. Concerns about the environmental impact of biofuels (especially GHG emissions from ILUC) coincided with corn price spikes and debates about the production capacity potential of the existing corn-ethanol regime. These concerns combined to form a reverse salient limiting further system development. The framing and articulation of the problem changed as the system evolved, new knowledge came to light and the problem was renegotiated. The US government responded by incentivizing and mandating cellulosic ethanol production and subsequent innovative activity was directed towards this goal. Inherently, in a dynamic and complex system, problems can never be fully resolved, partial solutions to problems change the problem space resulting in altered understanding of their nature. Thus reverse salients, and their related critical problems, change and influence how the system evolves, the rate of its expansion and how it is constituted.
The Brazilian sugar-cane-to-ethanol production regime is characterized as highly productive and efficient, and no reverse salient emerged in the same way. Indeed, such has been the momentum of the Brazilian biofuel system that it is re-directed away from economic stability towards further expansion beyond its initial national boundary through the development of export markets. A potential export market for Brazilian biofuels was created by the US focus on energy security and investments in domestic ethanol production, as well as the global intention to reduce GHG emissions. The export opportunity was coherent with the original economic development agenda and enabled by the demand-driven capacity stimulated by the introduction of domestic FFVs. Changing market conditions provided an opportunity for expansion and an altered understanding of the problem stimulated further efforts to increase the volume of bioethanol produced for export. Innovative activity directed at solving this reverse salient has been concentrated on major innovations in agriculture and refining technologies. In Brazil, new knowledge, especially speculative genomic science, has presented novel opportunities for solving these critical problems.
The framing and articulation of problems occurs within a context of relative institutional stability and the specific modes of economic governance instituted in different regions. In Brazil, prior to 1985, the governing military regime directly intervened in both the supply and demand sides of the biofuels industry. The Proalcool Program provided a comprehensive, system-wide, set of policies to induce growth. Petrobras, the State-controlled oil company, was a major coordinating firm, despite initial resistance. In comparison to the direct command and control approach of Brazil, market-based instruments were employed initially in the USA with policies based on market failure justifications, for example, R&D tax incentives and tariffs. The Renewable Fuels Standard in 2005 introduced demand side mandates and signified a change of style in State intervention reflecting the increased strategic importance given to the energy security problem. The oil firms, and dedicated biofuel firms, only entered the system to find substitutes for MTBE and in response to blending mandates. Dominant physical and social technologies create institutional lock-in, or path dependency. In Hughes' language, momentum provided inertia to the older well-established system. In the first two phases in Brazil and the USA there was little tension between the incumbent firms in the oil industry and the slowly emerging biofuels trajectory. In contrast, the oil companies in the USA have been relatively inactive in production and distribution of biofuels, but have initiated major investments in biofuel R&D. In Brazil the initial resistance of Petrobras was overcome by direct government ownership. Due to high levels of mandatory blending, the oil firm and the emergent biofuel system have coexisted in an almost symbiotic relationship. During the third phase there have been increasing tensions between the old and new systems in Brazil and the USA. Petrobras, already with significant biofuels capability in-house, created a fully owned biofuel subsidiary. In the USA oil firms have begun constructing networks around themselves involving public science institutes and dedicated biotech-biofuel firms in order to develop in-house capacity. The momentum or inertia in the incumbent system stifled the emergence of a new competing innovation system. Government intervention, in response to a major problem in the old system, has been a central driver of the new innovation systems in both countries.
The emergence of the biofuels industries in the USA and Brazil are probably the most prominent recent examples of governments intervening to "solve" large-scale political and ecological problems. The State has clearly played a crucial coordinating role in both innovation systems, though the style and level of intervention has varied spatially and temporally. We have taken the non-renewability and depletion of oil as the principal ecological problem around which two quite different eco-innovation systems emerged and evolved in the USA and Brazil from the 1970s. But our analysis has strongly suggested that the ecological problems are supplemented, framed and overlaid by a seamless web of political, economic and social factors which provide specific formulations of reverse salients in different contexts. Indeed, we would expect this to be the case for any example of an ecoinnovation system.
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